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ABSTRACT 
Since the turn of this century, stability in European continent, to a large degree, 
depends on political-military cooperation among European countries as well as the 
establishment of common goals in order to eliminate current threats and risks such as 
terrorism. As far as Poland is concerned, its priority is to be an active leader in improving 
common security policy within the boundaries of the European Union (EU) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Polish security policy and strategy is shaped by its 
geographical location which places Poland in NATO’s main strategic area opposite the 
Russian Federation and Belarus. In other words, Poland sees itself as the eastern “edge” 
of NATO’s area and as a “front-line” country. This motivates Poland to support NATO’s 
further enlargement to the East because Warsaw understands that it is a primary key to 
stability in Europe and has a responsibility to support NATO activities in this region. 
Thus, this thesis analyze the character of Polish Defense Policy after integration 
into NATO and EU and the impact this policy has national interests. It will specifically 
focus on ongoing efforts to adjust defense policy and strategy to meet contemporary 
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Since the turn of the century, stability on the European continent has depended to 
a large degree on political-military cooperation among the European countries and their 
establishment of common goals to eliminate current threats and risks such as terrorism. 
As far as Poland is concerned, its priority is to be an active leader in improving the 
common security policies within the boundaries of the European Union (EU) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Poland’s security policy and strategy is 
largely determined by its geographical location within NATO’s main strategic area, 
opposite the Russian Federation and Belarus. In other words, Poland sees itself as the 
eastern “edge” of the NATO area and as a “front-line” country. This motivates Poland to 
support NATO’s further enlargement to the East, because Warsaw understands that it  is 
a primary key to stability in Europe and has a responsibility to support NATO activities 
in this region.1 
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the character of the Polish Defense 
Policy since Poland’s integration into NATO and the EU and the impact this policy has 
on its national interests. The thesis will focus specifically on Poland’s ongoing efforts to 
adjust its defense policy and strategy to meet contemporary demands through political-
military cooperation and a dialogue with its allies. 
Today, after achieving the most important goal of its foreign and security policy, 
entering the EU on May 1, 2004, Poland has achieved satisfactory geopolitical stability 
and has an unprecedented chance to build national structures that will ensure 
development of the democratic state at all levels. Moreover, membership in NATO and 
the EU allow Poland to gain a stronger position on the European political stage and 
provide Poland with a sense of confidence in the face of unpredictable events or crises. 
Nevertheless, Polish policy makers must be politically aware that passivity and a lack of 
orientation would cause Poland to be pushed aside, into the background of European 
policy. It would be perceived as the object rather than the subject.2 The proposal for 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey Simon, “Central and East European Security: New National Concepts and Defense 
Doctrines,” NDU: INSS Strategic Forum no. 151 (December 1998) http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ 
SF151/forum151.html  (25 Feb 2006). 
2 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, “Polska w Zamecie Swiata.” Gazeta Wyborcza, (2004): 4.  
2 
Poland’s policy should cover broad politico-military horizons, because the key to success 
is being active on defense, not just in Poland’s national interest, but also with a 
disinterested involvement in problems that are important for the entire EU and 
transatlantic community.  
It is a well known that, currently, the center of gravity is shifting toward so-called 
“asymmetric” threats and risks that, to a large degree, concern people and societies, not 
national structures. These changes prompted a need to redefine the nature of transatlantic 
relationships, because the new challenges create security environments that are different 
than those of the Cold War period. The United States—the guarantor of security in 
Europe during the post-war period—today wants to be a partner of Europe as a whole and 
cooperates in aid of the elimination of global threats.3 Europe, however, wishes to play a 
significant and independent role in the global security system, although it is beyond its 
capabilities, especially its military capabilities, which are still insufficient to conduct 
military operations on a huge scale without the support of the United States. The process 
of seeking their own identity in the global policy will shape the new formula of 
transatlantic relations.4 
For Poland, as one of the biggest supporters of American policy in Europe during 
the last few years, this poses a very important challenge. Obviously, the problem is not 
simply the necessity to make a difficult choice or create a simple alternative with 
America or Europe. It requires Poland to build such a formula in transatlantic relations 
within the confines of the EU that would treat the United States as a participant in 
European security. The European continent still needs America, not only as a partner in 
solving its security problems, but also to stabilize the European system. That is why it 
would be a mistake for Poland to reject the idea of the inevitability of changes in the 
transatlantic formula. It could eliminate Poland from the process of seeking new 
solutions. However, it would also be a mistake to seek a formula beyond European 
solidarity.5 
                                                 
3 Michal Miaskiewicz, ed., Stosunki Transatlantyckie Wobec Problemow Swiatowego Bezpieczenstwa 
(Warszawa: Centrum Stosunkow Miedzynarodowych, 2003). 
4 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, “Polska w Zamecie Swiata.” Gazeta Wyborcza (2004): 5 
5 Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2006 presented at the session of the Sejm on 
February 15, 2006, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Stefan Meller. 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Government,information,on,Polish,foreign,policy,in,2006,4599.html (8 May 2006). 
3 
The stability, peace, and security in Europe have been realized not only by the 
strengthening of transatlantic cooperation but also by close regional and multilateral 
collaboration among neighbors. Hence, Poland has pursued the initiation of processes of 
historical reconciliation that facilitate the destruction of the post-Yalta order and the 
creation of a new security environment in the region. But it will not be done without the 
active engagement of “old” Europe in the process of integrating “new” Europe into the 
system of western values and structures, because there will be no cohesive, effective, and 
loyal Europe. It especially concerns the EU policy toward the eastern European states and 
Russia, whose democracies and economies are still fragile and susceptible to any external 
or internal turbulence. In case of their failure, it may lead to serious security 
consequences on the whole continent.6 
Today, in Poland, there is a huge debate on a suitable direction for a foreign, 
security, and defense policy that will not only maintain our strong Atlantic relations but 
also could facilitate building an appropriate position for Poland on the European stage, so 
Poland will have an influence on key decisions concerning both security and the 
economy. The other important issue for Polish policy is to develop, with the support of 
the EU and NATO, friendly and effective relations with Russia despite their troubling 
historical relations, which have involved wars, rebellions, repressions, and partitions. The 
creation of such a policy will not be an easy task because, to a large degree, its success 
depends on many factors and events both external internal, which are sometimes difficult 
to predict.7 
To explain and illustrate Poland’s views on security and defense issues and to 
understand its strategic culture, this thesis will answer a few very important questions. 
First of all, how have sociopolitical changes conducted in Europe over the last fifteen 
years and Poland’s membership in NATO and the EU influenced the Polish national 
security and defense policy? What is Poland’s current position toward the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), taking into consideration its 2004 accession into the 
EU and its recent active involvement in NATO’s operations in the Middle East which, 
                                                 
6 Bartlomiej Nowak and Rafal Rowinski, “Unia Europejska po Rozszrzeniu. Na Pierwszym Zakręcie,” 
Raporty i Analizy, no. 8 (2004): 11, http://www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/raporty/2004/rapian0804.pdf (3 May 
2006). 
7 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, “Polska w Zamecie Swiata.” Gazeta Wyborcza (2004): 5 
4 
according to some analysts, succeeded only militarily, not politically? In other words, 
what motives speak for Poland’s “instinctive” Atlanticism8 and simultaneous wish to 
broaden its influence on European security and defense policy? What is the importance of 
Polish strategy in the context of the success emerging from the European security 
architecture? What are the roles and functions of national institutions and structures in the 
area of security and defense? And how do its relationships with Russia and other ex-
Soviet republics influence the Polish security policy? And, finally, what is the prospect 
for its success? 
This thesis is organized as follows. The evolution and development of the Polish 
national security strategy is the subject of the second chapter. It discusses the security 
environment and the sociopolitical changes that shaped the security and defense policies 
of both “old” and “new” Europe. More specifically, it shows Poland’s integration with 
the Alliance and the role of the transatlantic community in regard to Poland’s security 
and defense policy. The chapter also describes the principles, priorities, and challenges of 
the national security and defense policy in the face of contemporary global threats and 
risks.  
The third chapter focuses on the role of the Polish defense policy in the context of 
national security. It describes the process that created the national defense policy and its 
principles and goals, which are derivatives of many internal and external factors. 
Additionally, the chapter depicts the main functions and roles of the national institutions 
and authorities that are responsible for defense policy planning and describes how these 
institutions evolved into democratic civil-military structures. 
The final chapter covers, among other things, the most important issues related to 
regional and subregional cooperation. It focuses particularly on the eastern dimension as 
the most important and sensitive part of the Polish security and defense policy. The 
chapter also draws attention, in this era of Middle East interest, to security issues 
pertaining to Russia and other independent post-Soviet countries that appear to have been  
 
 
                                                 
8 Marcin Zaborowski, “From America’s Protégé to Constructive European, Polish Security Policy in 
the Twenty-First Century”, Occasional Paper No. 56 (Dec 2004): 7, http://aei.pitt.edu/3392/01/occ56.pdf    
(24 April 2006). 
5 
forgotten. The main element of this problem concerns relations between Poland and 
Russia, which have never been easy, because of their common dramatic historical 
background.9 
Another issue in this chapter concerns bilateral Polish-American relationships, 
which undoubtedly have had the biggest impact on the Polish security and defense policy 
during the last seventeen years, because America became the security guarantor that the 
Poles had craved since the late eighteenth century.10 Additionally, chapter four examines 
Poland’s vision, as a member of NATO and the European Union, of the future role of the 
EU and its security and defense policy. These are generally seen by the Polish political 
elite more as a stabilizing factor in Europe than a superpower or counterbalance to the 
















                                                  
9  Irina Kobrinskaya, Love and Hate: Polish-Russian Relations Marred by Russian Unpredictability 
and EU and NATO Uncertainty (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, January 2005) 
http://www.aei.org/research/nai/publications/pubID.21920,projectID.11/pub_detail.asp (11 May 2006). 
10 Marcin Zaborowski, “From America’s Protégé to Constructive European, Polish Security Policy in 
the Twenty-First Century,” Occasional Paper No. 56 (Dec 2004): 21, http://aei.pitt.edu/3392/01/occ56.pdf    























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
7 
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF POLAND 
A. CHANGING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT AND DEFENSE AND 
MILITARY DOCTRINES 
Since the revolution of 1989–90, members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and Europe, especially central and eastern Europe, have been 
challenged by dramatic changes in the European security environment. The many crucial 
events of this period prompted many of the states to adopt new national security concepts 
and new military and defense doctrines. In 1990 Germany was reunified; in 1991, the 
Soviet forces withdrew from Czechoslovakia and Hungary; in mid-1991the Warsaw Pact 
collapsed; in 1992, the former Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia disintegrated; and in 
1993, Czechoslovakia was divided. At the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome, 
NATO replaced its 1967 “flexible response” strategy with a new Strategic Concept that 
better reflected the change in the security environment.11 After the next two NATO 
summits, it became obvious that the center of gravity of European security was moving 
toward the East. During the Brussels Summit in January 1994, member states took the 
first step in responding to the new challenges. They agreed to enlarge NATO and 
implemented the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). After the Madrid Summit, three of 
the eastern European states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—received an 
invitation from NATO which initiated accession talks. The Alliance then also decided to 
prepare a new Strategic Concept, which was finally adopted in Washington in April 
1999.12 
It is also notable that, at the end of the 1980s, the Western European Union 
(WEU) had been reactivated and returned to European politics in hopes of an 
independent European security policy. The WEU became instrumental in strengthening 
the operational abilities of the European countries in actions supporting peace. Moreover, 
many politicians believed that reactivation of WEU would make it an organization whose 
role was not only political and economic, but also military.                                                   
11 Jeffrey Simon, “Central and East European Security: New National Concepts and Defense 
Doctrines.” NDU: INSS Strategic Forum, no. 151 (December 1998), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ 
SF151/forum151.html (25 Feb 2006). 
12 Ibid. 
8 
Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, the western European countries began to 
express their readiness to take on more responsibility for European security. Creation of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 
gave birth to the second pillar of the European Union and initiated efforts to create a 
common European defense and security policy.13 Creating a common policy was not an 
easy job, however, because, within the Union, there were already several concepts 
concerning the tasks and goals of this policy. More important, there was no political 
consensus between the western Europeans about whether this policy should be created 
within the confines of NATO or beyond it. France strongly insisted on building an 
independent structure regardless of NATO and the United States. The British and the 
Americans, however, opted for a new rearrangement within NATO. They had a negative 
view of the French proposition, because military development of the WEU without 
cooperation with the alliance did not guarantee the creation of a reliable alternative for 
NATO and could be a danger to its strength. Eventually, the WEU was designated as the 
organization responsible for implementing the defense aspects of the European Union’s 
decisions on a foreign and security policy. And at Petersburg, Germany, in 1992, the 
WEU members agreed that they would use WEU military forces for joint operations in 
humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management, and peace 
enforcement.14   
In 1994, after the Brussels summit, NATO gave its support to the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), believing that it could play an important role in the 
evolution of the European security system. During the meeting, NATO approved the idea 
of creating a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters as part of NATO’s 
integrated command structure. It was designed to give NATO’s command structure 
additional flexibility to accomplish a variety of objectives, including facilitating the dual 
use of NATO forces and command structures both for the alliance and for operations run 
by the WEU. Its overall purpose was to encourage European nations to undertake 
                                                 
13 Nicole Gnesotto, ed.,  EU Security and Defense Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004) (Paris: 
ISS, 2004), 40. 
14 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 167. 
9 
missions with forces that were “separable but not separate” from NATO in the context of 
the emerging European Security and Defense Identity.15 
In 1999, there was a highly significant summit in Washington on the practical 
dimension of NATO/WEU/EU cooperation in security and defense. In spite of promising 
and compromise decisions, members found it difficult to reach agreement, because there 
were differing opinions on the development of a security and defense policy. Generally, 
NATO defended the position of the new member countries such as Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which had not a chance to participate in shaping a 
European security policy. France was NATO’s main opponent: it blocked the 
development of relations between NATO and the EU. Finally, at the end of the year, the 
NATO–EU negotiations came close to an agreement on how to work together in the 
future. During the December 14–15 meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the 
NATO allies noted that progress had been made by the four working groups. One of the 
areas discussed concerned agreement about the exchange of classified documents.16  A 
second agreement determined the rules of harmonization for planning defense processes. 
Next, the members negotiated the rules governing the EU’s constant access to NATO 
resources in independent EU operations. And, finally, they created clear rules of 
cooperation between the two organizations.  
The eastern European countries continued to be challenged by the changes in the 
European security environment and by NATO’s actions to create their own national 
security concepts and defense and military doctrines. Doing so, they were told, would 
secure their future interests on the international stage and enhance their ability to develop 
and maintain effective crisis management institutions, thereby enhancing their 
governmental legitimacy.17 In the late ’90s, a new NATO Strategic Concept was 
developed that focused on crisis management and civil emergency planning. In addition, 
after its experience in the Balkans, NATO increased its role in peacekeeping and the 
potential need to operate out-of-area to reduce the threat of proliferation and terrorism. 
                                                 
15 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 168. 
16 Ibid., 181. 
17 Jeffrey Simon, “Central and East European Security: New National Concepts and Defense 
Doctrines.” NDU: INSS Strategic Forum, no. 151 (December 1998), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ 
strforum/SF151/forum151.html (25 Feb. 2006). 
10 
The central and east European states, however, had also to take a deeper look at their 
security issues. They no longer perceived the major challenges as external, but rather as 
increasingly internal in nature.18 Mostly, they were afraid of threats connected with 
organized crime, illegal migration and smuggling, and government corruption. For 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungry, especially, given their early accession to the 
NATO pact, it was very important to adjust their national security concepts to fit western 
European standards.  
As for Poland, it is one of the countries that benefited most from the collapse of 
the old regime. More than a decade ago, Poland changed dramatically the geopolitical 
parameters of its security.19 And Poland’s participation in NATO initiated and facilitated 
its process of integration with not only the EU but also its security system. From the 
beginning, Poland’s political aspirations and objectives were supported mostly by the 
U.S. government, which views Poland as an important element of regional security. It is 
particularly important that the United States provide reassurance, because Poland is 
located at the strategic boundary between eastern and western Europe, which gives it an 
opportunity to be a key player in the foreseeable future.20 
Although Poland has a strong sense of belonging to the European community, the 
Polish elites aspire to be included in the “inner circle” of America’s closest allies and 
they openly support U.S. hegemony.21 Poland’s attitude toward U.S. policy is largely a 
result of its historical experience, which, especially during WWII, was very painful. That 
is why, for Poland to “become America’s protégé is an improvement both for its security 
and its status”.22 
Also since the early 1990s, Poland’s status has gradually increased, because, 
among other things, Poland has supported U.S. foreign policy. This was evident, 
                                                 
18 Jeffrey Simon, “Central and East European Security: New National Concepts and Defense 
Doctrines.” NDU: INSS Strategic Forum, no. 151 (December 1998), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ 
strforum/SF151/forum151.html (25 Feb. 2006). 
19 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Poland’s View on Global Security Issues (Sydney: University of New 
Wales, 2003), http://www.polishembassy.ca/news_details.asp?nid=86 (5 March 2006). 
20 Stanislaw Koziej, Polityczno-Strategiczny Wymiar Bezpieczenstwa Europejskiego (Warszawa, 
Wyzsza Szkola Businessu i Administracji, 2004). 
21 Marcin Zaborowski, Between Power and Weaknesses: Poland – A New Actor in the Transatlantic 
Security (Warszawa: Center for International Relations, 2003), 7.   
22 Ibid., 5 
11 
especially, when Warsaw readily contributed troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, 
in Kosovo in 1999, and, most recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq.23 The terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, showed that Poland has been and is one of America’s closest 
European allies: Poland responded fully to the United States’ policy in Iraq and has 
become a significant actor in transatlantic security. Poland’s role as a regional power has 
also been strengthened, and it is now a major advocate for further NATO and EU 
eastward enlargement. For instance, Poland supports the pro-independence movements in 
Ukraine and Belarus. On all of these issues, the Polish strategy culture agrees with 
current American security thinking, which promotes proactive military engagement when 
there is a possible threat to regional stability.24 
Poland also highly values EU membership, which has been one of the most 
important objectives of its security policy since 1989. Poland’s attitude toward the 
European Security and Defense Policy was incorporated for the first time into its 
National Security Strategy in 2000, which states that the ESDP and NATO constitute the 
second security pillar of the Polish state.25 Although, of late, EU foreign and security 
issues have divided Europeans, Poland has declared its readiness to fully participate as an 
integral part in both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security 
and Defense Policy—as long as they do not threaten or endanger the cohesiveness of 
NATO.26 Once more, Poland reminds all the European partners that the new European 
identity cannot be built on anti-Americanism because both the United States and Europe 
“share a common heritage and values.”27 In any case, in December 2003 the European 
                                                 
23 Marcin Zaborowski, Between Power and Weaknesses: Poland – A New Actor in the Transatlantic 
Security (Warszawa: Center for International Relations, 2003), 3. 
24 Ibid, 6. 
25 Fundacja Polska W Europie, “Europejska Polityka Bezpieczenstwa i Obrony,” Polska w Europie 
32, no 1 (2003): 69-88. http://www.pwe.org.pl/pdf/3900.pdf  (5 March 2006). 
26 CFSP WATCH 2004 – Poland, by Dr. Rafal Trzaskowski and Olaf Osica, p.5, 
http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%202004%20poland.pdf (6 March 2006). 
27 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Berlin: Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation, 2003).  
12 
Council approved the European Security Strategy (ESS), which confirms the United 
States’s leading role in European security.28 
Warsaw stresses that cooperation between the EU states must be based on mutual 
a political solidarity that strengthens the integrity of the Union and effectively serves its 
security interests. Poland also strongly expresses the importance of supporting countries 
neighboring the EU by providing assistance in their pursuit of democratic and economic 
reforms and helping them achieve European standards and facilitate future integration 
into EU structures. All of the Polish National Security Strategies that emerged during the 
last fifteen years focused on threats that resulted from sociopolitical and economical 
changes in the newly independent states in southeast Europe and Russia. Hence, Poland 
is interested in the EU’s preventive political role in places where potential conflicts may 
threaten Europe’s security.29 
 
B. NEW CHALLENGES 
Since 1989, after its first Parliamentary elections, Poland has pursued the creation 
of a security environment that is able to ensure its core principles and the goals of its 
national security policy. The fundamental security policy objectives are linked with 
Poland’s “sovereignty and independence, border inviolability and territorial integrity.”30 
Additionally, the state policy must “promote [the] security of the citizens, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, democratic order, stable conditions for Poland’s civilizational 
and economic progress, well-being of the people, protection of national heritage and 
national identity, implementation of allied commitments, [and] defense capability and 
interests of the Polish State.”31 The security strategy in Poland was built mainly on the 
basis of alliances, both transatlantic and European, that could ensure the creation of an  
 
                                                 
28 “The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in 
particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a 
military actor.” European Security Strategy, p.1. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (March 6, 
2006). 
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appropriate security environment. Nevertheless, for Polish policy makers, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Alliance is the primary organization that guarantees the fulfillment of the 
state’s security objectives.32  
But the international situation has constantly changed. And numerous socio-
political and economical changes have contributed to a rise in new threats and challenges 
that forced the allied countries to define their security requirements for the twenty-first 
century. The unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11 marked a turning point in 
political thinking about national as well as international security. From the beginning, 
Poland realized that it should immediately take steps to face the new challenges by 
actively participating in diplomatic and military efforts and by joining the global 
antiterror campaign.33 Those kinds of activities required making several significant 
changes in doctrinal documents as well as in the state institutions responsible for national 
security. One of the first steps was the government’s decision to replace the “old” 2000 
National Security Strategy which was still current as far as the state’s principles and goals 
were concerned. It did not correspond, however, with the dynamic changes in the context 
of a new national security policy.  
In February 2002, Poland’s prime minister, Leszek Miller, decided to create a 
new national security strategy. Many different factors influenced the development of the 
new document. Two of the most important factors reflected in the new national doctrine 
were: decisions made during the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 concerning 
the direction of alliance transformation and the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 
2002 which considered further reforms and development of a European identity.34 
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in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom allowed the Government to gain important 
experience and draw political conclusions that were applicable to the new security 
policy.35 
Since 2003, the “new” National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland36 
(NSSRP) has become its core document and the starting point for the creation of other 
sector strategies in fields that are fundamental to the state’s security and defense. An 
unfortunate exception is the 2000 Defense Strategy, which remains unchanged. Notably, 
despite differences in their strategic culture, the NSSRP and the ESS are similar in many 
ways. According to Aleksander Kwasniewski, former President of Poland, this means 
that the Polish view of security issues and international order are convergent with other 
important security institutions in Europe.37 The similarities are visible from the very 
beginning, where both documents describe the new global challenges and define the key 
threats.  
As far as the global challenges are concerned, the National Security Policy draws 
attention to the tensions and instability caused by “international terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the unpredictable policies of 
authoritarian regimes and the phenomenon of ‘failed states,’ which largely exacerbate the 
risk of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”38 
It also strongly emphasizes the role of globalization and fragmentalization processes that 
significantly influence national and international security.  
In the Polish doctrine, the key threats are redefined from “classical risks (armed 
invasion) that decrease in importance, toward the unconventional risks that originate from 
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barely identifiable nonstate entities.”39 These risks could cause a state of danger for 
citizens, national services, and the state facilities essential to effective governance.  
Unlike the European Security Strategy, Poland’s Security Policy identifies 
organized international terrorism (OIT) as a primary threat to global and national 
security, while stressing simultaneously that the level of threat is different for individual 
states that for the world overall. Although the ESS firmly states that terrorism “poses a 
growing strategic threat to all of Europe,”40 the uncontrolled proliferation of WMD, “is 
potentially the greatest threat”41 for Europeans. The issue of proliferation is also 
identified by the NSSRP as an important risk for the state’s territory, but it gives way to 
terrorism even though there may be no danger of a direct terrorist attack in Poland. 
Having studied these issues, we believe that even international organized crime (IOC) is 
more of a danger to Poland’s security then a terrorist threat, because of the country’s 
transit location between the East and the West. Poland’s National Security Policy stresses 
that, to a large degree, it facilitates an increase of new criminal gangs on Polish territory 
and attracts other international criminal organizations that weaken the state and EU 
security.42  
Undoubtedly, the phenomenon of “failed states” and “rogue states” is a peculiar 
and particular catalyst for various new threats. Most of these states create risks both for 
world peace and for the security of their citizens. Their governments respect neither the 
principles of democracy nor human rights.43 In addition, many of them are bothered by 
sociopolitical, ethnical, and religious conflicts, which add to their already weak 
condition. The NSSRP takes note of authoritarian regimes that, to “preserve and expand 
their hold on power, they are willing and ready to sacrifice peace and violate the 
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inalienable rights of their neighbors.”44 Indeed, these states are outside the scope of 
international law and facilitate the creation of transnational terrorist organizations.   
Part One of the NSSRP points at a number of significant factors which might 
destabilize the Polish state in the long run. There are economic, environmental, and 
population problems that must be solved to guarantee stability and the development of 
the national economy. One of the most important issues is Poland’s energy security  
which at present depends to a large degree on the Russian Federation. It is critical, 
therefore, that Poland to “diversify the supplies of energy carriers, particularly crude oil 
and natural gas.”45  
 
C. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
According to the Poland’s National Security Policy, the current challenges and 
threats dictate a need for a holistic approach because “the line of distinction between the 
external and internal security aspects becomes blurred.”46 This is why international 
cooperation, in particular, within NATO is very important to the preservation of the 
security environment and the balance of power. Poland supports the evolution of NATO 
toward new capabilities and missions that add to the vitality of the Alliance. And thus the 
NSSRP stresses that the evolution of NATO guarantees the extension of the area of 
democracy and stability in Europe and adjacent regions. Hence, the Polish security policy 
places great emphasis on active engagement “in the maintenance of international peace 
and security on both a regional and global scale.”47 Therefore, Poland is present in the 
Balkans, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, not to mention its UN peacekeeping missions in the 
Golan Heights and Lebanon, despite the fact that Poland has one of the lowest GDP per 
capita of the EU states.48 
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Unlike the ESS, the NSSRP devotes few paragraphs to Eastern policy issues. 
Poland wants to deepen cooperation between NATO and Russia in accordance with the 
Founding Act and the Declaration of Rome. Furthermore, Poland advocates Ukraine’s 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations and opts for strengthening the role of the Partnership for Peace 
in safeguarding the security of South-Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.49 
Today, Poland’s foreign policy and defense system are significant tools in its 
security strategy, because their goal is to promote a favorable international security 
environment for the country. Therefore, Poland also participates in security cooperation 
within the confines of the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the aims of 
which include the “effective deterrence of existing and potential threats, consolidation of 
the underlying values of the Union and an influence—through cooperation and crisis 
response instruments—on the shape of the international environment, particularly within 
the immediate neighborhood of the Union.”50 Poland is especially interested in the 
development of the EU’s Eastern dimension and stresses the need for a common EU 
approach to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova with simultaneous involvement in 
other EU areas of interest.  
In comparison to the European Security and Defense Policy, the NSSRP 
emphasizes that Poland, as a member of NATO and the EU, will support the building of 
military and civil capabilities within the EU, as they too are part of NATO’s European 
pillar and make use of NATO resources.51 Yet Poland is also against attempts to create 
mini-alliances within the Union that duplicate functions of the Alliance and disrupt its 
efficiency.   
Another important issue in the NSSRP is the role of the United Nations (UN) and 
other international institutions that contribute to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. In spite of the fact that the Iraqi crisis exposed the UN’s weaknesses, Poland 
will continue to opt for maintaining UN responsibilities as defined in the UN Charter. 
Furthermore, the Polish Government wants to take part in a reformation of the UN by 
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providing both greater support in peacekeeping missions and trained personnel. In 
addition, Poland will develop standards that “will turn international law into an effective 
instrument to address the new international challenges, including in particular those that 
arise from international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, the ‘failed states’ 
phenomenon, and states that support terrorism.”52 The Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) are also important institutions that can help 
Poland safeguard its security and stability.  
 
D. MAIN TASKS OF NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY 
SERVICES 
According to Poland’s National Security Strategy, the assurance of citizens’ 
security and the protection of Poland’s national heritage and borders are, to a large 
degree, the responsibility of the national security institutions. The new threats generally 
originate in places that are far from Poland, but they those who threaten us may penetrate 
our borders and materialize on Polish territory.53 So the effectiveness of the state’s 
internal security also depends on the harmonious collaboration of all its national 
institutions, authorities, and administrations, in accordance with the “powers and 
responsibilities assigned to them by the Polish Constitution and laws.”54 The police, 
border guards, special services, counterintelligence, and other national institutions and 
agencies are responsible for a number of activities that can improve Poland’s internal 
security standards both locally and nationwide.55   
A large portion of the NSSRP also is devoted to the armed forces of the Republic 
of Poland, one of the most significant parts of its defense and security system. The 
primary task of the armed forces is to “assure Poland’s security and to offer allied 
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assistance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”56 Participation in national 
defense is realized by adequate preparation and use of the appropriate assets to secure the 
national interests and to counteract any threats during both wartime and peacetime. 
Simultaneously, the armed forces participate in the implementation of Poland’s allied 
commitments and ensure the collective defense on the continent according to 
international agreements and resolutions within the alliances of which Poland is a 
member.57   
The armed forces are also a component of the security assurance process, in the 
state’s close neighborhood and other parts of the European territory, through the 
development of military cooperation with other states creating collective security. They 
take part in consolidating the international security environment by participation in 
military stabilization missions, mainly within the confines of the United Nations, NATO, 
the EU, and OSCE, as well as ad hoc coalitions.58  
An important element of the new strategy is the opinion expressed about the 
gradual replacement of static forces with modern, mobile, and highly specialized units 
that are capable of cooperating with the civil structures and institutions in reaction to 
military and nonmilitary threats. These units have an obligation to prepare and maintain 
their military capabilities so they can take part in crisis-response and peacekeeping 
missions in or out of the area.59 The Strategic Defense Reviews’ response to specific 
needs serve to define the state’s defense requirements and to adapt its armed forces to 
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E. CONCLUSION 
It is generally believed that even the best security doctrine would not be worth 
much without its effective realization. Thus, the NSSRP can set an example for others to 
follow, because few states realized, in the last three years, with such determination, the 
assumption that “passiveness is not a solution.” The active participation of Poland in the 
antiterrorist coalition engaged in military operations in Iraq, and its involvement in the 
stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq, have definitely changed the Polish view of 
security issues. Participation in these kinds of operations is a matter of collective security, 
both globally and regionally, and what follows as a consequence is the state’s security. 
Some opponents of this point of view claim that sharing in stabilization operations may 
be more dangerous for a state’s security and may generate more risk. But, paradoxically, 
by fighting the phenomena of state failure and organized crime and by preventing 
regional conflicts, the coalition is actually contributing to worldwide security.61 
Although the NSSRP takes into consideration many significant new trends in the 
area of international security, several strategists and analysts have revealed a number of 
weak points. In February 2006, the new minister of national defense, Radek Sikorski, 
criticized the NSSRP, claiming that there needs to be a new national security strategy, 
one that is more focused on internal security issues. The present strategy concentrates 
primarily on external aspects of national security and fails to sufficiently define Polish 
national interests and strategic goals.62 According to some military specialists, mistakes 
were made in the very beginning when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not the Ministry 
of National Defense, led the way in creating Poland’s strategy. Consequently, the 
document was written from a foreign affairs’ point of view and covers issues that are 
mostly directed to international security, omitting national needs and requirements. 
Military strategists, especially, point at the document’s lack of clear and logical goals for 
the armed forces. In addition, implementation of the NSSRP was not accompanied by the 
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creation of a new national defense strategy as a derivative and executive document. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to define new security priorities and goals.63  
The vice-minister of national defense, retired general Stanislaw Koziej, also 
thinks that a new national strategy should be created that addresses Polish national goals 
and interests; then, Poland should try to find consensus within the Alliance. It is exactly 
opposite to the way that previous Polish national doctrines were created: they were 
dominated by allied prospects relating to common threats.64 
No doubt, the discussion of a new national security strategy should be conducted 
in a public forum: it would be a unique opportunity to win societal support and 
understanding of security thinking. Obviously, it is not easy to create a document that 
will satisfy everybody and meet all demands. It could be accomplished, however, by 
appointing a special group of independent specialists from a variety of national 
departments and institutions. According to security specialists, the next national security 
strategy of the Republic of Poland will be ready to sign within the coming year (2007), 
and what follows, will facilitate efforts to work out other sector strategies responsible for 
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III. DEFENSE POLICY 
A. THE ROLE OF DEFENSE POLICY AS A PART OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY 
Over the last two decades, the definition of security changed from a typically 
military-centered meaning of the term to a broader definition that draws more attention to 
the kinds of threats that became dominant with the turn of the century. These threats have 
forced Poland, like many other nation-states, to create new tools to address the new 
challenges: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the 
unpredictable policies of authoritarian regimes and the phenomenon of “failed states,” an 
increase in ethnic and religious hatred, and factors such as environmental and natural 
disasters and globalization, and their “side effects.” For centuries, a country’s defense 
establishment and armed forces comprised the primary tool to prevent and eliminate 
emerging threats. But now, countries’ defense systems must be much more complex and 
sophisticated and require the exploitation of their entire national potential. The collective 
national effort required to prevent and defend against such risks necessitates the 
involvement of all the national and international civil and military institutions and 
services. Success in this effort requires their cooperation, integration, compatibility, and 
interoperability as they develop adequate security concepts and policies and create and 
maintain an integrated command system and its executive structures.65 
The defense policy is a crucial element of national security, and one of the main 
roles of the national security strategy is to implement that policy. As part of the security 
policy, the defense policy covers a variety of activities—diplomatic, economic, military, 
and those pertaining to intelligence gathering—conducted by the state. Those activities 
serve various purposes: securing the inviolability of state borders, protecting state bodies 
and public institutions and ensuring their continuity, and protecting the citizenry and 
assuring their survival in times of conflict or crisis.66 Thus, the main role of the defense 
policy is to identify and evaluate potential military threats and their effects. In addition, it 
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defines the concept and determines the optimal capability package of the state that is 
necessary to realize its strategic goals and the tasks that are required to prevent dangerous 
situations such as military conflict and crises.  
During peacetime, the state uses the defense policy to coordinate the defense 
processes involved in assuring the readiness of the system overall for implementation 
during times of crisis or war. Defense policy tools and defense structures can also be used 
to neutralize nonmilitary security threats and risks as well. For example, participating in 
actions that help a civil society cope with catastrophes—search and rescue (SAR) 
missions, crisis management operations, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid projects, and 
international relations and cooperation promotion—also contributes to European 
integration processes.67  
The state’s general strategic assumptions, goals, and the specification of potential 
threats and challenges are defined in and derived primarily from the national security 
strategy and other legal statutes. The national defense strategy is considered the primary 
document of defense policy. It directs the defense establishment, including the armed 
forces and the other national defense institutions and services, in areas such as planning, 
molding structures, and developing training plans for readiness in defending the state. In 
addition, the national defense strategy outlines defense contributions to other areas of 
national security.68 
The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland (NDSRP) was 
implemented in May 2000, shortly after the 2000 National Security Strategy, and was a 
result of Poland’s entering NATO in 1999. Although the security environment changed 
after the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001, and the government enacted 
a new national security strategy in 2003, the NDSRP has remained the same. Although a 
new national defense strategy could be developed that would respond more effectively to 
this century’s new challenges and threats, especially global terrorism, the original policy 
is still in use. And it continues to be the basis of Poland’s defense assumptions and 
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concepts because it remains linked to NATO’s strategy concepts and thus helps to 
determine its leading principles and to define NATO’s primary strategic tasks. 
 
B. DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC PLANNING, FUNCTIONS AND ROLES 
In Poland, many significant factors, both internal and external, influence and 
contribute to the process of creating a national defense policy and strategy. First, the basis 
of the policy and its legal framework derive from several legal documents and statutes: 
• The Constitution Act, which regulates the basic laws and relationships 
between executive power and the administrative bodies; 
• The law designating a universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland, 
which regulates basic issues related to the rules and procedures of the 
functioning of the Polish national defense system during peacetime; 
• The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland; 
• The law pertaining to the Office of the Minister of National Defense, 
which defines the minister’s role in managing the defense system, 
including the initiation and coordination of work on projects to find 
solutions in the area of national defense.69 
There are also some significant external legal documents that represent or affect 
Poland’s position in today’s security environment. The North Atlantic Treaty and 
NATO’s Strategic Concept play a significant role. The treaty establishes guidelines for 
the development of detailed policies and military plans and provides defense planners 
with the main purpose, tasks, instructions, and strategic perspective in the context of the 
evolving security environment and the potential challenges and risks in today’s world.70 
The state’s collective expression of those legal acts and documents is the national 
defense policy, which, as part of the national security policy, is based on the following 
principles: 
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• National responsibility and the common defense system: Poland’s 
citizens and state structures are responsible together for the collective 
defense of the country and for providing the services necessary to create a 
common defense system in times of crisis or conflict; 
• Solidarity and integration with allies: Poland stands ready to be an 
active member of the NATO Alliance, stressing the importance of 
maintaining transatlantic relations, solidarity, and cohesion in realizing 
common strategies and policies; 
• Cooperation and partnership: Poland’s integration into the European 
Union includes full cooperation with its security and defense policies and 
the development of a military partnership with various armed forces 
interested in the consolidation of security and stability both in the region 
and on the Continent as a whole; 
• Building of mutual regional trust and military stability: Poland’s 
regional commitments will determine the potential size of the Polish 
military, as Poland continues to build a mutuality of trust and to facilitate 
the preservation of a balance of power in the region;  
• Reliability and deterrence: Simultaneous with the building of mutual 
regioal trust and stability, Poland pursues and maintains the appropriate 
military strength to assure an indispensable strategic deterrence to 
potential enemies and guarantees its defense credibility within the NATO 
framework. Because, for Poland, one of the most important elements of 
deterrence is the Alliance’s military potential, particularly its nuclear 
weapon capability;  
• Flexibility of defense response: Poland joins NATO in assuring a defense 
system with the ability to conduct all kinds of operations and maintain 
continuity in all possible situations, as well as the flexible to move from 
peace functions to crisis and conflict operations;  
• Civil–military cooperation: This plays a significant role in the defense 
system overall, based on cooperation between the civil and military 
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institutions, as well as other internal or external nongovernmental 
organizations and civilian populations during peace, crisis, and war; 
• Balancing the country’s defense needs with available resources: A 
basic principle that facilitates an optimal characterization of the defense 
needs and abilities of the state. Poland’s national defense needs are 
determined in keeping with the state’s geostrategic location and the 
prognostic development of its international situation and its roles and 
responsibilities resulting from NATO membership.71  
Give the great significance of those principles, in Poland’s defense policy, the 
concept of a national defense system plays an important role among all the other defense 
concepts. Its national defense system is the whole of the forces and means, both military 
and nonmilitary, that the state provides in order to execute the requisite defense tasks. 
Poland’s national defense system consists of three basic elements: a control defense 
subsystem, the national defense authorities; and two executive subsystems, one military, 
the Polish Armed Forces, and one consisting of nonmilitary elements. 72 
The control defense subsystem is responsible for assuring the realization of state 
decisions in the area of national defense at all levels, ministerial as well as field-level, 
during all states of alert, peace, crisis, and war. The president of the Republic of Poland 
and the Council of Ministers, the Cabinet, as organs of the executive authorities, are the 
main bodies responsible for the management and execution of tasks in accordance with 
the Polish Constitution and other legal documents and statutes. According to the 
Constitution, the president “shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the 
sovereignty and security of the State, as well as, the inviolability and integrity of its 
territory.” The president is the supreme commander of the armed forces, appoints the 
chief of the general staff and commanders of the branches of the armed forces,73 and, 
during wartime, and designates the commander in chief of the armed forces. The National 
Security Council is the advisory organ to the president in regard to the internal and 
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external security of the state. Currently, the security council consists of a prime minister 
and the ministers of national defense and foreign affairs. In addition, there is a minister of 
the interior and administration and of the Sejm and the Senate and, finally, a head of the 
Law and Justice Party.74  
The Council of Ministers and the Government Administration is responsible for 
defense management during peacetime and cooperates with the president in the areas of 
domestic and foreign policy.75 The Committee for Defense Issues, part of the Council of 
Ministers, is an internal organ that supervises and coordinates the implementation of 
government tasks and state administration agencies responsible for the internal and 
external security of the state. If necessary, the realization of individual tasks resulting 
from either national needs or those executed within the framework of NATO or other 
international organizations could be done by the implementation of additional procedures 
and temporary operational structures.76 
In the area of national defense, the minister is a key element in the defense 
administration, managing all the activities of the Polish armed forces during peacetime. 
He also initiates the creation of the state’s basic defense assumptions and is responsible 
for coordinating and supervising the implementation of task realizations by the civil 
administration, local governments, institutions, economic agencies, and other 
organizations.77 The general staff, however, is the body that typically deals with the 
strategic planning of the armed forces. 
In accordance with the NSSRP, the Armed Forces comprise the most crucial 
element of Poland’s national defense system. Their role is to protect the state’s borders 
and safeguard Poland’s national interests. Their primary tasks are included in both the 
NSSRP and specified in the Politico-Strategic Defense Directive (PSDD) as well as in 
other national and allied operational plans.  
Poland’s National Defense Strategy emphasizes the concept of using the military 
forces in accordance with the differing levels of risk and types of strategic operations.                                                  
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This concept evolved as a result of Poland’s participation in a variety of military and 
nonmilitary operations both within and outside Poland’s national borders, a necessity of 
its burden-sharing responsibilities within the Alliance. The main idea is that the Polish 
armed forces must be prepared at all times to execute three types of operations: 
prevention and stabilization, crisis management, and warfare.78 
Prevention and Stabilization.   These operations occur during peacetime and 
rely on continuous foresight and the monitoring of external politico-military threats and 
risks. Their purpose is to prevent such threats from developing into crises or military 
conflicts by intervention and the use of immediate neutralization and stabilization 
strategies. Prevention and stabilization operations strengthen the international security 
environment through cooperative military programs such as the Partnership for Peace. 
The PfP program promotes democratic values and enhances the stability and security of 
non-NATO countries by primarily peacekeeping, humanitarian, and SAR operations.79 
Crisis Management.   The purpose of these operations is to rapidly overcome 
and control crisis situations that may endanger the state or international community’s 
interests and to minimize possible results and restore precrisis order, especially within 
Polish and allied territories. According to the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Poland must 
also maintain appropriate interoperative military capabilities to manage crises; this is 
essential for the preservation and strengthening of Polish and Euro-Atlantic security.80 
Warfare.   According to the Constitution, Poland may conduct war operations 
only in the case of direct enemy aggression on Poland or its allies. Such aggression could 
mean be large-scale war that forces the state to employ all its defense forces for a long 
time, or it could be a local military conflict that engages only limited state resources and 
capabilities for a short time. Regardless of the scale, for Poland as a NATO member, any 
war would be a coalition effort because of the Alliance’s concept of collective defense of 
all its members. Hence, Poland bears in mind the possibility of waging war on its own 
territory or taking an active part in a military action directed by an ally. 81 In addition, the 
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Polish armed forces must be ready to execute a variety of other nonmilitary tasks such as 
relief operations and aid actions taken during and after natural disasters. 
Today, Poland’s armed forces comprise land forces, air force, navy, and Special 
Forces. The land, air, and navy forces all include operational units that are trained to 
execute their tasks both jointly within a multinational structure and as domestic territorial 
units. To ensure their appropriate effectiveness, the Polish armed forces focus on the 
achieving and maintaining the following operational abilities: combat and mobilization 
readiness, intelligence and reconnaissance effectiveness, command efficiency, mobility 
and respond flexibility, lethal effectiveness, and survivability.82  
 Another very important part of the Polish defense system consists of its non-
military defense elements which are responsible, in general, for the protection of citizens 
and national structures in the event of a crisis or military conflict. They are prepared to 
provide material, informational, and spiritual assistance to the population in the event of 
an external threat. The nonmilitary groups are also tasked to provide material and human 
reinforcement the armed forces and nonmilitary support of Poland’s allies operating on 
Polish territory. In all these situations, they provide three elements: information, 
protection/security, and economic aid.83 
 Information.  For a defense system is function effectively, it must have various 
kinds of accurate and current information that is pertinent to the protection and 
propagation of Polish national interests in the international arena. It must be informed 
about the weaknesses of potential enemies. In a conflict situation, the defense 
administration must keep the public appropriately informed so as to maintain the national 
will, morale, and determination and the population’s persistent cooperation in the war 
effort. Now, on the threshold of the twenty-first century, the tasks involved in obtaining, 
sustaining, and using information have intensified and are increasingly sensitive issues. 
Thus, a proper exploitation of media is vitally important both to Polish society during 
peace and war and to our potential enemies.  
 Protection. In addition to their information-related activities, the nonmilitary 
agencies are tasked with the assurance of secure functions of national structures as well 
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as the protection of citizens and Poland’s national heritage against military and 
nonmilitary threats. This includes protection of national borders, important persons 
(VIPs), and governmental buildings, and the maintenance of public order during military 
conflicts. In regard to nonmilitary threats, within its defense system and complex 
planning, Poland maintains an adequate population security system and civil crisis 
management systems based dispensed structures of the public administration and other 
nonmilitary services and formations.84  
 Economic aid. In the economic arena, the nonmilitary agencies ensure the 
material and financial basis of defense realization tasks and facilitate civilian survival 
during times of crisis or war. They are also responsible for creating and maintaining the 
state’s defense reserves. Moreover, they must maintain the national defense infrastructure 
and continuously conduct developmental research to improve national defense. They take 
part in the execution of tasks that support allied forces operating on Polish territory and 
participate in the accomplishment of ally defense investments in Poland and NATO 
member countries. One of the most important elements of the nonmilitary agencies’ 
economic-defense efforts is the defense industry, which must be constantly restructured 
and modernized in close cooperation with military industries in the EU and NATO.85  
 To ensure the readiness of all aspects of the Polish defense system and to prepare 
the Polish people to live and survive in emergency situations, Poland systematically runs 
defense preparation programs. Generally speaking, defense preparations consist of 
defense planning and programming and the maintenance and development of the defense 
system. They are coordinated by the minister of national defense, who must also take into 
consideration the tasks and duties inherent in Poland’s Alliance commitments and 
requirements. In the process of the state’s defense preparations, it is important to define 
the strategic goals, establish exact defense tasks, and determine means and forces 
appropriate to Poland’s to national and allied needs.86 Those goals, tasks, and duties are 
determined as part of the state’s strategic operational planning and defense programming.  
                                                 
 84 The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland (May 2000), 37. 
 85 Ibid., 38. 
 86  Stanislaw Koziej, “Sztuka Reakcji”, Polska Zbrojna 597,no.4, (March, 2002), 3 - 4, 
http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/artykul.html?id_artykul=597 (March 25, 2006). 
32 
The defense system’s strategic goals are defined in keeping with several internal 
and external factors. First, they must relate to the national interests stated in the 1997 
Constitution. Second, they must preserve Poland’s fundamental values: independence, 
freedom, human rights, security of its citizens, and safeguard of its national heritage.87 
These are the basic rights of Polish society, and the state’s and government’s foremost 
responsibility is to create a security environment that ensures the fulfillment of Poland’s 
most valued national interests.  
Other factors that influence the determination of the defense system’s strategic 
goals are the external security environment and related circumstances. Nowadays, that 
environment is quite stable, and Poland’s involvement in various alliances gives Poland a 
great opportunity to strengthen its own security. Poland’s membership in NATO, its 
integration into the EU, and its bilateral relations with the United States allow Poland to 
think about its security in new and different ways than during the last three hundred 
years. During that lengthy period, Polish territory was continuously occupied, except for 
thirty brief years, by enemy forces, and it had no participation in alliances to ensure the 
stability and security of the state. So, it is particularly important for the all of Poland’s 
security institutions to be involved in creating a proper security environment and to 
actively participate in collective defense. Poland shares with its allies the responsibility to 
contribute military forces to various kinds of missions in the vicinity as well as in remote 
places in the world.  
Undoubtedly, Poland’s historical experience and geopolitical location challenge 
its defense policy. The goal in the region is twofold. First, there is a regional effort to take 
part in an ongoing process of democratization and integration of newly independent states 
such as Ukraine and Moldova. A second goal is to support pro-independence movements 
in Belarus and promote NATO’s and the EU’s enlargement beyond Poland’s eastern 
borders.88 In this context, it is crucial for Poland to normalize its political relations with 
Russia and then act as the more significant partner in the process of shaping relations 
between NATO and Russia. Other aspects shaping Poland’s strategic goals are the 
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contemporary threats and risks mentioned above that require a holistic approach to the 
problem of security. In the end, only cooperation, integration, and the propagation of 
democracy can preserve the balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic security 
environment.89 
In Poland, defense planning and programming are the responsibility of all the 
public administration bodies combined with the military commanders and their staffs. 
The Polish defense planning cycle is precisely determined by chronological planning 
phases integrated with NATO’s collective defense planning system. There are three main 
phases of defense planning. In the first phase the main goals of defense planning are 
defined, the second determines the target levels in individual areas, and the third phase 
focuses on plans preparation.90  This approach facilitates the definition of common goals 
and the determination of appropriate means and forces needed for the realization of 
strategic tasks.  
At the end of every even-numbered year, the Defense Planning Committee 
releases the NATO Ministerial Guidance which starts the first phase of defense planning 
and programming. In general, the Ministerial Guidance determines common goals, which 
are normally achieved by states’ armed forces during a six-year period of planning. After 
approval of the NATO Guidance, the Council of Ministers’ releases its Guideline for 
Defense Planning and Programming as a directive starting point for Poland’s planning 
process. This facilitates the creation of a Polish defense system and indicates its basic 
goals, tasks, and requirements for the long term.91 The document is prepared in keeping 
with national and Alliance priorities, military requirements, technical abilities, resource 
availability, and political considerations. 
The next phase of Poland’s defense planning and programming includes 
negotiations, discussions, and mutually consultations to harmonize national and Alliance 
planning. The most crucial action during this phase is setting target levels for the 
individual spheres of defense planning and programming. This includes a special focus 
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on the armed forces and nonmilitary defense as well as a determination of the rules 
required to ensure economic and financial support for realizing set goals.92 During this 
phase also a strategic document, the Politico-Strategic Defense Directive (PSDD), is 
produced and successively actualized up to the highest level of the state administration.  
First, the Defensive Directive presents a defense planning and programming 
assessment as well as financial plans for the next five years. Second, it determines the 
way the entire Polish defense system will react and function in the event of a crisis or 
war. Third, it gives directions for armed forces development and the target levels in 
individual areas of defense planning and programming. The Defense Directive is also the 
basis for the preparation of action plans for individual defense system elements.93   
During the third phase of the Polish defense planning cycle—plans preparation—
there is an Annual Defense Review Cycle that evaluates Poland’s development plans and 
the financing of its armed forces. The Defense Review begins in March and is sent along 
with the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) which provides information on the level 
of task realization of accepted goals of the armed forces. It also presents the development 
plans of the Polish Army and financial plans for the next five years. The questionnaire is 
carefully analysed by NATO institutions is the subject of additional negotiations and 
arrangements with other NATO members. Finally, the Defense Review Committee 
releases the General Report, and, after the ministers of defense acknowledgment, the 
General Report along with its supplementary documents comprises NATO’s Five-Year 
Plan.94 With the report’s acceptance, Poland’s defense documents and plans are 
actualized and the defense planning and programming process is finalized.  
However, even the best national defense system needs continuous maintenance 
and development. Therefore, a current full realization of Poland’s defense plans and 
programs includes the following: maintenance of the armed forces and actualization of 
their defense-economy tasks, including defense industry functions; maintenance of 
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strategic stocks and a mobilization potential within the limits of the national economy; 
maintenance and development of defense infrastructure and defense and military 
training.95 
Thus, in the area of maintenance of the defense management system, Poland is 
focused on the assurance of the essential military skills and knowledge of management 
and administrative personnel, military staffs, and commanders in accordance with the 
changing needs and conditions of defense task realization. Moreover, the efficiency of the 
defense management system is developed by implementing different system solutions 
that ensure interoperability with allied institutions, effective civil-military cooperation in 
both a national and ally dimension as well as command continuity in times of peace, 
crisis, and war.96 
As far as the maintenance and development of nonmilitary elements are 
concerned, attention is focused on characterizing the legal and organizational basis that 
assures the efficient execution of defense tasks by nonmilitary agencies. In addition, it is 
important to assure effective civil-military cooperation, including support of both 
Poland’s forces and allied forces, within the tasks of a host state. One way to maintain 
these elements is by the optimal exploitation of protective, economic, and information 
potential to accomplish defense tasks and the adjustment to war of the defense industry.97 
Another significant area of defense system development is training. In a nutshell, 
the goal of training overall is to prepare all the management structures, military forces, 
nonmilitary defense elements, and the entire society to contriubte effectively to the 
realization of defense tasks and self-defense under crisis and war conditions. Organizing 
serial war games and strategic, operational, and tactical exercises on all levels of the civil 
and military structures will facilitate revision and verification of adopted strategic-
operational concepts and organizational-functional solutions in the area of national 
defense.98 
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C. CONCLUSION 
After the collapse of communism in 1989, the reform of Poland’s national defense 
system and the restructuring of its armed forces was one of its most important challenges. 
It was crucial to determining Poland’s readiness to become a part of the new world, 
whose security values at the time were very different. The process of democratizing the 
state’s administration and infrastructures began after the Round Table agreement between 
the Communist government and the banned trade union Solidarność and other opposition 
groups in Warsaw on April 8, 1989; it included, among other things, the establishment of 
a legal framework of civilian control over the armed forces.99  
During the first part of the 1990s, the establishment of a strong democratic basis 
for the defense sector proceeded very slowly. This was partly because, until October 17, 
1992, when the “Little Constitution” was implemented, the legal framework was based 
on the Polish Constitution of 1952. Even the creation of a contemporary constitution did 
not resolve all the problems. It did not give sufficient power to the minister of national 
defense and created conflicts between the ministry of defense (MoD) and the chief of the 
general staff. The so-called Drawsko Dinner in 1994 showed the weaknesses inherent in 
civilian control over the military, as the highest ranking generals issued as vote of no 
confidence for the defense minister. This vote was done with the cooperation and support 
of the president of Poland, Lech Walesa, who was against some of the new military 
reforms proposed by the new prime minister, Waldemar Pawlak, concerning the 
principles of subordination of the general staff to the defense minister.100 
Fortunately, during the second part of the ’90s, the process of transformation sped 
up and a political consensus for joining NATO was established. New defense reforms, 
the 1997 Polish Constitution, and activities such as participation in various peacekeeping, 
stabilization, and humanitarian missions within the Partners for Peace program facilitated 
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Poland’s integration into a new common European security system which changed 
forever the balance of power on the Continent.101 
Nowadays, Poland, as a part of the democratic world, along with its allies and 
partners, pursues the improvement of the world’s security environment by its active 
participation in undertakings that could, directly or indirectly, contribute to its own 
security as well. Although Poland’s defense policy has a regional (European) and 
subregional (eastern European) range, Poland readily contributes its military forces to 
other regions in the world while remembering that its strategic culture is rooted in Polish 
geopolitical history. This attitude toward a holistic approach to global security is the only 
solution in the fight against such phenomena as international terrorism, the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and other equally dangerous activities that could destroy 
the existing security order.102 
For ages, the security environment around the globe has been constantly 
changing. Recently, however, it has entered a phase of turbulence, changeability, and 
unpredictability and a period of sudden innovations and quick and radical changes. It is a 
very dangerous, unpredictable time, in which it is often difficult to predict even the near 
future. The events of 9/11 indicate that tomorrow’s security environment could be 
drastically different than today’s and the notion of security itself could suddenly undergo 
radical changes. All countries must build national institutions and structures that have the 
appropriate resources to survive and to function and cooperate effectively with other 
international security institutions in the face of threats in order to protect their citizens.103 
In Poland, there are many authorities and national institutions involved in the 
process of creating the national defense policy. While the Ministry of Defense, because 
of its resources, has the leading role, today’s reality forces the state to create one 
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integrated civil-military security system at the highest level of the administration.104 But, 
in spite of the fact that Poland has recently made enormous progress and has become a 
more important and reliable partner on the European stage, it still has plenty to do in the 
areas of both internal and external security and defense. Hence, as many of Poland’s 
experiences in the last several years have proved, the best way to achieve that goal is 
through politico-military international cooperation, partnership, and dialogue. And these 
must occur not only within a NATO or EU framework but also with other subregional 
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IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PROCESS OF THE 
NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY: THE INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, POLITICAL-MILITARY 
COOPERATION, AND ALLIANCES 
A. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVINRONMENT AND REGIONAL 
COOPERATION 
Since the dawn of history, sovereign states’ existence has depended on 
maintaining good relations and alliances with other states in the region. Alliances were 
created to strengthen a state’s international position, to maintain the balance of power, 
and for religious, political, and economic reasons. But whatever the reason, they have 
always been supported and strengthened by military cooperation between the states that 
created collective security and defense. This process has gone on at least since the 
Renaissance and it continues to constitute a guaranty of improvement of national 
security.  
Due to its geopolitical position between Germany and Russia (formerly the Soviet 
Union), Poland repeatedly throughout history has strived to accomplish various alliances 
that would secure its national interests. Unfortunately, most of those alliances proved 
unreliable, and, therefore, the last three hundred years was marked by inherent insecurity 
and vulnerability to external aggression.105 
The recent history of the Third Republic shows that Poland has tried to improve 
its security environment and to pursue its national interests, in an effort to become an 
important international player on the European continent. From the beginning of the 
1990s, Poland’s strategic goals were directed toward achieving Western democratic 
values and developing its security system. Hence, the main purpose driving its national 
foreign and security policy was to attain membership in NATO and the EU. The most 
obvious way to achieve this was to join in an international regional collaboration that 
included states from the Euro-Atlantic community, neighboring countries, and 
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international organizations.106 Poland made an effort to strengthen the influence of its 
policies by promoting them on both a north-south and a west-east axis.  
Earlier experiences resulting from participation in international security 
organizations such as the UN, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), and, later, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, undoubtedly 
prompted Poland to change its political thinking in the area of security and defense.107 In 
addition, Poland was actively engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the 
regional framework, which became a very important part of its foreign and security 
policy. First, it facilitated creation of new methods for overcoming the Cold War division 
of Central Eastern Europe and provided an effective foundation for new security 
architecture and cooperation in the region.  
The formation of the “Weimar Triangle” in August 1991 by France, Germany, 
and Poland was the expression of the historical reconciliation between nations. It also 
served as an instrument designed to help Poland endorse the European policy trend and to 
support its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.108 Another form of regional 
cooperation, the “Visegrad Group,” was also created in 1991, by Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland. The main idea of this undertaking was the realization of common 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, owing to the convergence of their national interests, historical 
and cultural similarities, and geographical closeness.109 Along with these projects, there 
were many other examples of regional and subregional cooperation—the Council of the 
Baltic States, Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), and the Central  
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European Initiative—which, in addition to unity and cohesion, also promoted democratic 
values, freedom and respect for human rights, and the rule of law in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
As a result of this cooperations, Poland gained valuable experience in various 
areas and at different levels of its national structures. Although Poland continues its 
collaboration with all those partners, its geopolitical situation has changed since 1999 
when it became a part of the transatlantic community. Finally, Poland’s efforts of many 
years were crowned with success. Poland’s satisfaction at becoming a member of NATO 
was expressed by then President Aleksander Kwasniewski, in a speech he gave during the 
gala event in Washington marking the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the 
Alliance: 
To us Poles, the very existence of NATO had always been a beacon of 
hope in a pre-1989 divided Europe that freedom and democracy could 
survive. That the iron curtain would not be there forever. That as soon as 
Poland recovered its full sovereignty and self-determination it would be in 
a position to create, together with the whole Euro-Atlantic community, a 
better future for itself and the entire European continent. Today, sixty 
years since the outbreak of World War II, since the bombing of Warsaw 
and Gdańsk, since the days of hate and contempt, since the Holocaust, our 
dreams, and the dreams of our fathers and grandfathers have come true.... 
Our satisfaction with this fact is further enhanced by our awareness that it 
closes the door on an almost three-hundred-year run of misfortunes in 
Polish history. Freedom was the cause for which the best sons of our land 
have fought, died in executions, or been deported, generation after 
generation.… The North Atlantic Alliance has over the past fifty years 
proved its worth as a reliable and effective organization. Its political and 
military umbrella has protected its member countries, safeguarded for 
them conditions for normal development, and strengthened their 
cooperation and solidarity. All of us, living on both sides of the Atlantic, 
need the continued presence of the Alliance today, after the global 
collapse of the bi-polar political set-up following the disintegration of 
communism, and in the wake of the conclusion of the cold war. Both 
NATO and the American presence in Europe help stabilize the situation in 
the Euro-Atlantic area and lay the foundation for its democratic 
development. The organization’s enlargement to include Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary has expanded the zone of security in 





countries—friends and partners of Poland—must become the beneficiaries 
of the guarantees of security, stability, and development: The door to 
NATO must remain open.110 
 From then on, Poland began to realize its efforts to broaden its foreign and 
security policy toward the east, acting as a “bridge to the new democracies of Europe, 
and a champion of the interests and security of [its] neighbors, such as the Baltic States, 
Ukraine and Slovakia.”111 This became one of Poland’s most important strategic 
challenges, because further enlargement toward the east would create a security buffer 
against the threats and risks resulting from Poland’s politico-geographical location. 
 
B. EASTERN DIMENSION OF POLISH SECURITY POLICY  
Poland’s interest in the politico-geographic space between the current border of 
the EU and Russia is a characteristic of its defense and security policy. Polish policy 
makers pursue and establish new relations with close neighbors that would assist in 
continuing the EU process of integration and enlargement to the East. Poland realizes that 
desisting from that process would cause a lasting peripherization of Eastern Europe and 
backwardness in the region. As a consequence, Poland, has for many years remained the 
front state with all the complexes of a “bulwark.”112 
Because of their common historical background, Poland’s relations with its 
eastern neighbors have never been easy, and it has sometimes been extremely difficult to 
find a compromise. Currently, of its eastern neighbors, Russia is the most significant in 
terms of Polish security. In Polish–Russian relations today, the political atmosphere does 
not correspond to the current level of their economic, humanitarian, and cultural 
cooperation. Although between 2000 and 2004, Presidents Putin and Aleksander 
Kwasniewski met ten times in both official and working visits and the intensity of their 
contacts on the parliamentary, ministerial, and social levels increased, political relations 
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between Russia and Poland are the worst they have been since the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc in 1989. According to political analysts, the immediate cause of tension is the lead 
role that Poland played in late 2005 in the Ukrainian conflict. President Kwasniewski 
clearly sided against the Russian-supported presidential candidate and supported the 
leader of the so-called Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko.113 
But the problems in their mutual relations actually began much earlier and are 
caused primarily by prejudices and fears from the past. History remains a sore point 
between the two nations, beginning with their different approaches to the 1945 Yalta 
conference agreements and their assessments of the events in Katyn. In addition, relations 
between the Russian Federation and Poland continue to be directly affected not only by 
the political situation in the two countries, but also, to a far greater extent, by their 
relations with the West. Both the complex political situation in Poland and the difficulties 
that the Putin administration has encountered in Russia are giving rise to a “populism that 
feeds on myths and stereotypes of social consciousness. In Poland, it is Russian 
imperialism, in Russia, the Polish-American anti-Russian conspiracy.”114 In all 
probability, this is the reason Polish-Russian relations have had so many ups and downs 
during the last decade and are often analyzed as a love-hate relationship. 
Undoubtedly, during the last decade, these prejudices and a mutual reluctance 
have had a significant influence on bilateral relations. Russia strongly opposed NATO’s 
eastward enlargement, which in 1999 brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
into NATO.115 From Moscow's perspective, NATO was a Cold War military bloc that 
lost much of its relevance with the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 
(USSR) and the Warsaw Pact (WP). “Furthermore, eastward enlargement created a new 
division of Europe and brought NATO directly onto Russia's border via the Kaliningrad 
exclave. Russia felt betrayed by former Central and East European allies that quickly 
distanced themselves from democratic Russia in matters of security and aligned 
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themselves with NATO. Poland's drive for NATO membership was especially hurtful 
given its geopolitical significance, proximity to Russia, and “Warsaw” being the 
namesake of the Warsaw Pact.”116 
Once Moscow unwillingly accepted “Poland's close accession into NATO it then 
sought to dissuade further NATO enlargement, particularly involving the Baltic states of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, former Soviet republics, and possibly Ukraine. Poland, 
however, was a strong proponent of NATO's open-door policy of continued enlargement 
and was a vocal supporter of the Baltic states as well as being an advocate for Ukraine. 
Thus, the second wave of NATO enlargement also proved to be an irritant in Russian–
Polish relations.”117 
In addition, the Russian attitude toward further enlargement, remaining negative 
in principle, depends, in a sense on possible reactions and consequences. First, on the 
mutual ability of Russia and NATO to achieve a compromise on security issues 
considered to be essential and, accordingly, to increase the level of confidence and 
cooperation. Allowing for the considerable differences between the concerns of both 
parties, the important factor in Russian–Polish relations is what Poland’s position will be 
as a NATO member in resolving these contradictions, and in Russian–Ukrainian 
relations, the degree to which Ukraine will understand the Russian position. At the 
present stage, Poland’s active support of further enlargement, owing to misgivings about 
its situation as a frontier-state, has a negative influence on the the Russia–NATO 
dialogue in general and on Russian–Polish relations in particular.118 
Unlike NATO enlargement, the EU’s eastward expansion did not cause such 
strong opposition or criticism on the part of Russia. Moscow did, however, raise concerns 
about the “negative consequences that Poland’s and Lithuania's membership in the EU 
would pose for the Kaliningrad exclave”.119 
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Despite the fact that economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries 
started to improve before Polish accession to the EU, the political relations between the 
two countries still are hardly constructive or positive.120 As some Russian analysts note, 
the Kremlin regards Poland not only as a major factor in the triumph of the Orange 
Revolution in Kyiev, but also as a key geopolitical “link in the ‘tier of unfriendly states’ 
that is being formed along Russia’s western borders from the Baltics to Ukraine.”121 
For a number of Polish and Russian commentators, Warsaw’s active role in the 
2004 Ukrainian political upheaval—which ended in what Moscow perceives as its largest 
strategic defeat since the end of the Soviet Union—is but an element of a broader trend. 
The Kremlin views the European Union’s 2004 sweeping eastward expansion, especially 
the emergence of the “Eastern Dimension” sponsored by Poland, as a serious geopolitical 
threat. The Kremilin credits that threat particularly to what it perceives as NATO’s 
“tendency of selectively offering partnership arrangements” to the countries sandwiched 
between Russia and United Europe. “There exists a widespread feeling in Russia,” one 
commentary argues, “that Poland is reluctant to accept the common rules of the game and 
is eager to distinguish Ukraine (and potentially Moldova and Belarus) from other eastern 
neighbors, which transfers the whole issue to the domain of power politics.”122 
As the Poles see it—and the Poles contend that, for obvious reasons, they have a 
special understanding of Russia–Ukraine’s reorientation toward the EU is a major, even 
historic, additional increment in Russia’s steady loss of influence in its own region, a loss 
of influence that began with the success of Solidarity in Poland in 1989. Polish analysts 
attribute what they regard as Russia’s bad behavior, especially over Ukraine, to its failure 
to carve out a post–Cold War identity for itself. At the same time, while the Russians are 
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tempted to recognize the EU and its expansion east as an economic opportunity, they see 
it as a danger, especially to Russian prestige.123 
It is notable that, despite many disputes between these countries, there were also 
many attempts to improve mutual relations. In 2000, when Vladimir Putin became 
president, Russia and Poland showed their desire to make some changes in their political 
relations. During an official visit in July 2000, Putin, along with his Polish counterpart, 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, decided to improve bilateral relations and pledged to put 
behind them a decade of frosty relations between the two countries and to forge closer 
links for the future.124 It was a very significant move which showed the goodwill of both 
countries, because this visit was preceded by the largest spy scandal since the collapse of 
the USSR as well as by very aggressive Chechen protests in Poland against Russia in 
February 2000. Most likely, for Russia, it was also a good occasion to improve its 
relations with NATO and the EU. At the time, Putin saw Poland as a bridge to the West, 
rather than as a disloyal former ally who changed sides.125 
For many observers it was a great breakthrough and gave hope for normal 
relations. A visible shift toward an improvement in Russian–Polish relations became 
evident in 2001, after Prime Minister Kasyanov’s visit to Poland and after the Polish 
parliamentary elections, which brought the Social Democrats to power. President 
Kwasniewski’s team wished to advance its dialogue with the Kremlin and was much 
more successful in that then their liberal predecessors, who had drastically worsened 
relations with Russia. 
After September 11, which radically changed the face of global politics, 
the Russian president clearly demonstrated his support for the Western 
alliance. Not everyone in Russia—especially the top military leaders—
appreciated his position however. President Putin tried to be consistent. 
Even before September 11 he had started to purge the opposition within 
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the Russian Ministry of Defense, dismissing the strongest opponent of 
Russia–NATO cooperation, General Leonid Ivashov.126 
Some Western media pointed out that the events of September 11 forced East 
European nations to reevaluate their relations with Moscow. Speaking about the Chechen 
Information Center in Krakow, Kwasniewski said that he would “never allow terrorist 
organizations to act from Polish territory against partners of Poland.”127 He was not the 
only Central European leader to gradually change his position regarding Russia. The 
Czech prime minister, Milos Zeman, noted that the time had come to “take note of the 
depth of the political and economic changes that took place in the Russian ‘democratic 
state.’ ” “Cooperation with Moscow does not mean that we reject the values we have 
chosen after 1989,” said Zeman.128 “The Central European countries were trying to find 
their proper place, one in which they would not feel dependent on Russia as in the years 
of Communism, and one in which they would not distance themselves from Russia as 
they had done just after the fall of the Berlin Wall.”129  
In January 2002, President Vladimir Putin went to Poland on an official visit. It 
was the “first official visit by the head of the Russian state to Poland in eight years and 
the first visit of a Russian leader to a member of the former Warsaw Pact that had 
become a member of NATO.”130 For Poles, it was a special gesture, because Putin not 
only honored the Soviet soldiers who liberated Warsaw from the Nazis, but also laid 
flowers at the monument to the warriors of the Armia Krajowa (the internal Polish Army 
which during World War II operated from London and fought against both the Germans 
and the Soviets). This was widely commented on by the Western reporters who covered 
Putin’s visit to Warsaw as a sign that Putin was definitely moving beyond protocol and 
the usual Soviet stereotypes.131 After that, political ties between the two countries 
became warmer and meetings between the respective prime ministers became frequent 
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and institutionalized. Unfortunately, since 2003, the effort to improve relations between 
Russia and Poland has been partially wasted because of a lack of political compromise.  
As a result of recent political events, especially the planned Baltic gas pipeline 
between Russia and Western Europe, the economic situation between Russia and Poland 
has deteriorated as compared to three years ago. In September 2005, President Putin and 
the former German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, signed an agreement to build a pipeline 
across the Baltic Sea.  Undoubtedly, to the conservative new Polish cabinet, this was a 
clear signal: the agreement was directed against Poland and its interests. Poland is always 
suspicious of deals to its detriment between Moscow and Berlin. Therefore, Warsaw 
called on the European Commission to consider alternatives to the planned route because 
it bypasses Poland and other formerly communist countries that are now part of the 
European Union.132 
The Kremlin’s quickly responded. Gazprom, the Russian gas giant, announced 
that it planned to review its contract with the Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG), 
Poland’s gas monopoly. As a result, since the beginning of 2006, Poland, as a member of 
the EU, has been charged as much for gas as the other western EU members. 
Additionally, Russia temporarily banned meat and plant imports from Poland because of 
alleged sanitation problems. In November 2005, Stefan Meller, the former Polish foreign 
minister, who earlier had served as ambassador to Moscow, went to Russia in an attempt 
to bring relations with Russia back to normal. During the visit, he talked with his Russian 
counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, about contentious issues and laid the groundwork for a 
meeting of both nations’ prime ministers and chiefs of industry.133 
Although Russian–Polish relations have always been difficult and far from ideal, 
there is hope for a restoration of bilateral cooperation based on mutual trust and respect. 
Obviously, much work still remains to be done, but both countries understand that they 
will not achieve their goals unless they abandon long-standing stereotypes and prejudices.  
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In the end of 2005, the new Polish president, Lech Kaczynski, recognized that 
relations with Russia should be improved. They are the key to Poland’s regional security, 
not only from military threats but also from threats such as terrorism, organized crime, 
and the influx of illegal immigrants. Promoting Poland’s economic interests also is a key 
priority regionally, just as achieving membership in NATO and the EU is its top foreign 
policy priority. For Russia, Poland is increasingly seen as a useful bridge to western 
Europe. Poland's prospective role as the most important NATO/EU member from the east 
and as an expert on the east within NATO and the EU makes Poland especially 
important.  
In resent months, another very important issue for Poland’s foreign and security 
policy is the matter of Belarus, which continues to experience complications, especially 
with Russia, on its way to democratization and a free market economy.134 The Polish–
Belarusian relationship is in trouble, mainly because of Belarus’ unfriendly activities 
directed against Polish activists and community centers in Belarus. 
Initially, in early 1990, relations between the two countries were quite intense, as 
Poland influenced Belarus to join in various operations to strengthen the position of both 
countries on the Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow axis. Unfortunately, since the 
presidential elections in 1994, when Alexander Lukashenka became president of Belarus, 
their bilateral relations have gradually worsened. In December 1999, Belarus and Russia 
signed an agreement in Moscow that, in the future, would facilitate bringing common 
associated states into existence. This means that their defense and security systems would 
be even more integrated then they are now and therefore would constitute a regional 
counterbalance to NATO troops. Because of that agreement, it is clearly in Poland’s best 
interest to support the Belarusian democratic opposition, which is trying to overcome 
Lukashenka’s regime. Some of the opposition leaders come from Polish minorities, 
organized in Polish community centers, and belong to the biggest nongovernmental 
organizations in Belarus.135 Unfortunately, in spite of many attempts to exert pressure on 
Lukashenka’s regime, Poland’s have been completely useless. And the diplomacy of the 
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EU and the United States has evidenced a similar ineffectiveness. After the fraudulent 
elections in March 2006, it became obvious that the Euro-Atlantic community should 
stop this vicious circle of impossibility and should consequently take a break from its 
bureaucratic approach to Belarus. The best scenario for Belarus may be to conduct a 
bloodless revolution similar to the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution,” which prevented the 
government from stopping the process of democratization.  
According to many analysts, the Polish government’s and Polish society’s active 
support of the Ukrainian revolution resulted in an increase of mutual confidence and 
cooperation between the two nations. In addition, the president of Ukraine, Victor 
Yushchenko’s last visit to Poland in May 2006 confirmed that both countries are 
interested in the further development of mutual cooperation in the economic and security 
areas.136 This kind of relationship has not been seen for a long time in modern history. 
Therefore, it is especially important for Poland to build a strategic partnership with 
Ukraine in order to create an appropriate balance of power in the Central-Eastern 
region.137 Like Poland, Ukraine’s geopolitical location determines its importance in the 
European security environment.  
Beginning in 2004, Ukraine has made an effort to overcome its past and to join 
the European security and economic network. Ukraine recently became a member of 
several European organizations: OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the Central European 
Initiative. Moreover, Ukraine strengthened its relations with other organizations, such as 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which guarantee the stability and security of 
its economy.138 
Ukraine’s most significant effort, however, is its cooperation, within the confines 
of the Partnership for Peace program, with NATO. Its relations with the Alliance began 
in 1991 when Ukraine became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
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(NACC). Then, in 1994, it joined the PfP program, developing further relations with 
NATO which facilitated the signing of the Charter on Distinctive Partnership in Madrid 
in 1997. This moved cooperation between NATO and Ukraine to a new level. In the last 
few years, Ukraine has visibly increased its participation in European security by signing 
the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 2000 and approving the Open Skies 
Treaty which makes an important contribution to transparency in arms control.139 
Besides their significant contribution to international peacekeeping activities, Ukrainians, 
along with Poles, pursue regional military cooperation as expressed by their common 
military exercises and the creation of the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion (UKRPOLBAT), 
which is not only able to act regionally but is also capable of executing other missions 
out-of-area. 
Undoubtedly, Poland and Ukraine have shown that different kinds of cooperation 
within the confines of different organizations that propagate democratic values, freedom 
and respect for human rights, and the rule of law contribute to preserving the balance of 
power and significantly increase chances of global peace. Currently, due to the new 
security challenges which require close politico-military cooperation and dialogue, 
according to many strategists, the regional and global interdependence between states is 
mostly manifested in their security and defense policies.140  
 
C. NEW CONDITIONS OF A NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY: POLITICO-
MILITARY COOPERATION, DIALOGUE, CONFIDENCE- BUILDING, 
AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
The end of the Cold War did not cause changes that would eliminate all global 
threats and risks, but it did open doors that make it more possible to solve other problems 
surrounding security issues. Today, the world still faces the kinds of racial, religious, and 
ethnic intolerance that often lead to serious conflicts and the creation of dangerous 
phenomena such as terrorism. The transformation period that resulted in peace in many 
regions is very fragile, and the only way to stabilize it is to create a new balance of 
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power. Peace depends also on the international community’s will and ability to 
implement existing mechanisms of European and world security. An important part of 
this security is solving potential conflicts by preventing them from escalating by building 
confidence and security.141  
Poland, as a serious and reliable partner that is trying to create an environment in 
which the state can develop in peace and security, understands that a country must ensure 
its security itself. So, it is important that Poland’s defense and security policy not be 
limited, as in the past, to the protection of its own national borders.142 National defense 
and security must become an international issue, because the disruption of peace by 
anyone anywhere in the world is a danger to the peace and security of the whole world. 
That is why, each country, regardless of its potential or size, must join with other states to 
contribute to the establishment and reinforcement of a collective security system.143   
It is notable that Poland does not promote a wide-ranging security and defense 
policy that is merely responsible for preventing war and restoring peace. The policy must 
also actively and effectively address tensions that may appear and ways to eliminate 
sources of crisis. Moreover, Poland will not implement this policy only by using armed 
forces or its diplomacy, but is supported by a national policy as well as by individual 
international organizations in which Poland is an active participant.144 Stability, peace, 
and security in Europe can be realized, first, by strengthening the collaboration and 
building mutual confidence between states. Thus, Poland as a new element in the Euro-
Atlantic security system, seeks more comprehensive and productive foundations on 
which to build bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation in the various areas of 
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security. The overall objective should be to establish regional strategic stability and 
contribute to the reinforcement of European and international peace.145 
Poland’s contribution to the prevention of crises and war is based on the 
dissemination of legitimate democratic values and cooperation within the confines of 
international forces for crisis management and maintenance of international and regional 
security under different security organizations. Participation in security organizations 
provides all the members protection from contemporary risks. Members are also able to 
play a significant role on the international stage through the implementation of their 
nation’s contribution to the collective defense according to each one’s capabilities. 
Generally, international military cooperation is successful when it is flexible and when 
participants choose the size and type of engagement that their countries will support 
during all kinds of operations. Therefore, it is especially important to support the creation 
of multinational units. These will provide a chance for all states, even small ones, to share 
the burden of the common security.146 Political decisions made in the spirit of a broader 
linkage, cooperation, and solidarity for the basis for the creation of multinational military 
forces. The question of national sovereignty and identity, which that has to be guaranteed 
in cases of multinational cooperation, has an important influence, but it should not be a 
reason to find it impossible.147 The conditions for entering such cooperation include, 
among other things, creation of common strategies, doctrines, and the civil-military 
structures for unifying planning and procedures. The readiness and effectiveness of these 
structures are achieved by common exercises, which help to overcome national 
diversities resulting from culture, historic, and linguistic differences.  
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D. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 
POLISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
Military alliances are an essential tool in the realization of a national defense 
policy. Membership in international security organizations do not absolve Poland, 
however, from the duty of taking care of its own security. Thus, Poland must actively 
engage in various internal and external undertakings aimed at ensuring the state’s security 
and strengthening its position on the international stage.148  
It is a well-known fact that Poland’s security and defense capability is mainly 
built on the basis of the Atlantic Alliance. Even so, Poland is involved in the 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy. The need for this policy 
seems obvious to Poland: it views NATO as the most effective and reliable alliance 
because NATO has the appropriate infrastructure and procedures. Furthermore, the 
presence of the United States, the world’s only superpower, in NATO also affects its 
credibility. So Poland opts for harmonic cooperation between the European states and the 
United States in the name of their common security and defense interests. Poland also 
emphasizes that Europe should not compete with America in the matter of global security 
because going in that kind of direction in its policy could have negative consequences for 
both global and European security.149   
Poland’s preference for a strong U.S.-led Alliance and its role in the global 
security and defense system is part of a tradition that started much earlier than 1992 when 
Poland applied for NATO membership. Clearly, strategic considerations played a central 
role in current Polish–American relations, but cultural and historical factors brought the 
two partners together and facilitated their cooperation. Historically, these include the 
prominent role of two Polish generals, Kosciuszko and Pulawski, in the America’s 1776 
war for independence; America’s role in recreating the Polish state in 1918 (President 
Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” declaration); and America’s role in ending the Cold War.150 
In addition, the Polish American community of ten million members provided a strong 
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political constituency, with well-connected and determined individuals working behind 
the scenes with the U.S. government to make sure that Yalta would never happen again in 
Europe.  
For Poland, it was the U.S. administration and the Federal Republic of Germany 
that, along with central and eastern Europeans nations, overcame the reluctance of the 
Western states and opposition from Russia for NATO enlargement. More important, it 
was done without a crisis in relations with Russia or evisceration of NATO as military 
alliance critics had predicted.151 The driving force for NATO enlargement to the East was 
“to create a democratic, peaceful, and secure Europe as a whole, whose future could be 
better than the continent’s bloody past.”152  
Poland, especially, was interested in the creation of a new security environment in 
the region, so it vividly supported U.S. policy in this matter. As time went by and 
bilateral military as well as economy cooperation developed, Poland appeared to be one 
of the United States’ closest European allies. As a result of this realization of their 
common goals, Poland became a regional leader and warmly supported the second wave 
of enlargement, setting an example for others to follow in the matter of state 
democratization.153  
The special bond between the United States and Poland was also confirmed by the 
United States’ powerful support, both financial and educational, during the modernization 
of Poland’s armed forces. The most significant example of this aid was a $3.8 billion loan 
from the U.S. Congress in 2002, the largest military loan in memory, to purchase forty-
eight F-16 fighter jets from Lockheed Martin.154 It demonstrated the unique closeness of 
the two countries and indicated the direction and priorities of Poland’s defense policy. 
During bilateral politico-military meetings, politicians typically stress how Polish-
American military cooperation has strategic importance for Poland.  Thanks to it, the 
Polish armed forces have undergone huge structural, organizational, and technological 
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changes. The process of Polish military transformation was conducted by drawing on, 
among other things, the strength of American experience and assets that facilitated the 
development of Poland’s combat readiness. This was tested in the last several NATO-led 
missions and operations. 
Poland’s dedication to the Alliance during the Kosovo conflict and its readiness to 
support development of an antimissile shield on its territory caused the American 
government to become convinced that Poland had become an important part of the 
common defense system. From then on, the U.S. administration began to consider Poland 
as a model ally and a regional leader in Central and Eastern Europe.155  The events of 
9/11 and the global war on terror were the main factors that revealed Poland’s distinctive 
Atlanticism.  
Poland emerged as a one of the few European countries prepared unconditionally 
to support American foreign policy in Iraq.156 It is notable that, up to 2003, there was no 
decision as controversial in the Third Republic of Poland, as its call-up of armed forces. 
Poland’s support for the antiterrorist coalition was manifested, first, by its organization of 
an international conference on terrorism just after 9/11; second, by sending more troops 
to the Balkans to relieve U.S. and British military forces that might be needed elsewhere. 
Finally after 2001, when Americans started the Afghan campaign, Poland declared its 
readiness to give direct military support, by sending antibiological and engineering troops 
to Afghanistan, along with “GROM,” its best Special Forces unit.157  
Although the decision to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom was made by a 
majority of the Polish parliament and had substantial support from the Polish populace, 
with time, this became the subject of many disputes. The criticism concerned, especially, 
the legitimacy of using military force against the Saddam regime and the lack of any 
rational benefits resulting from participation in the coalition. Warsaw’s request for 
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removal of nonemigration visa requirements, for example, received a negative response 
from the U.S. Congress. Also, Poland’s military industry was also allowed only minor 
participation in the rearmament of the Iraqi military forces and in the reconstruction of 
Iraq.  
In addition, many Polish politicians known for their pro-Americanism, such as 
Poland’s former prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and the former U.S. National 
Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, criticized Polish 
defense policies toward Washington. First, they noted the importance of Poland’s 
independent thinking, which could guarantee increased respect on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Second, they advised Poland, in the future, to take into consideration the 
possible political complications that might result from its decisions and actions. Finally, 
they advised Poland to maintain moderation in its interminable desire to manifest 
Poland’s devotion to America. 158  
Today, some Polish political scientists agree that sending Polish troops to Iraq 
was not preceded by appropriate public debate and an analysis of the profits and losses 
that would have implications for future Iraqi operations. According to them, the 
arguments for and against were considered only after the first Polish combat casualties 
occurred and the first political failures connected with Poland’s clear-cut subscription to 
the “coalition of the willing.” The original idea, incidentally, was to create “coalitions 
defined by the mission” from outside NATO. The opponents of Poland’s intervention in 
Iraq strongly believed that it might endanger the unity of the Atlantic Alliance as well as 
Poland’s position regarding the EU and its rising foreign, security, and defense 
policies.159  
Another pro-American view, however, depicts Poland’s engagement in Iraq as a 
political break-through that has provided Poland with an opportunity to increase its 
influence and importance in transatlantic relations and thereby improve Warsaw’s 
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position in Europe.160 Obviously, it is very difficult to evaluate all aspects of Poland’s 
participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, because Poles, first and foremost, did not feel 
the same threat from global terrorism that the Americans and the British did. 
Furthermore, Poland did not have any direct geopolitical interests in the Middle East 
region, so the political decision to send Polish troops was the result of many other 
different and changing factors.  
The arguments for Poland’s active participation in a politico-military coalition 
were legitimized by the conviction that Iraqi regime posed a threat to international 
security because of its alleged possession of WMD. In addition, as an example of an 
authoritarian state, which openly supported radical Muslim extremists, Iraq contributed to 
the proliferation of global terrorism. Thus, the Polish government decided, not only 
because of its allied commitment, but, foremost, because of its active engagement in the 
global war on terror to facilitate building a safer future.161 Poland’s assumption that 
world security is also Poland’s security shows a preventive approach toward terrorism 
which is then fought on its own territory. Therefore, the controversial policy of 
deterrence and a preventive strategy, along with a preemptive strike, became the main 
tools in its policy against the “Axis of Evil.”162 One of the chief arguments legitimizing 
using force was a declared will to oppose global terrorism in the name of protection and 
spreading democratic values to other parts of the world.  
It is often argued that Poland, by taking part in the GWOT, also wanted to gain 
more political power and thereby strengthen its transatlantic bonds and gain economic 
and military benefits. Additionally, some political experts claim that it was also an 
expression of Poland’s discontent with the fact that its influence on the EU’s security and 
foreign policy was being reduced by France and Germany because of the so-called Letter 
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of Eight,163 which was widely perceived as opposing the Franco-German attempt to 
speak for the entire EU in the area of foreign and security policy.  
Nowadays, many find it difficult to answer the question whether the Polish way of 
dealing with the growing Iraqi crisis has been appropriate. In analyses of the current 
political situation, Poland finds itself in the position of a state whose status depends to a 
large degree on transatlantic relations between America, France, and Germany. 
Undoubtedly, it is Germany, France, and Great Britain, not Poland, despite its 
contribution to the Iraqi campaign, that are the main strategic allies in Europe and have 
the appropriate military and financial capabilities to deal with worldwide terrorism.  
For those reasons, Warsaw has blended well into the American, and also Franco-
German, division of Europe: those who were with America or those against it; those who 
took a stand on global security or those who “missed a great opportunity to shut up.”164 
Although Poland had practically no chance to affect the U.S. or Franco-German 
positions, Poland’s policy was to keep a reasonable distance and maintain its composure 
while still maintaining its view on this issue. Instead, Polish society was witness to a 
sequence of bizarre events that exposed the essential weaknesses of Polish foreign policy 
during actions conducted under the pressure time and events.165  
It is generally believed that, presently, in the face of changing priorities and 
political situations, there is a need for the creation of a new approach to Polish-American 
relations. The eastward EU and NATO enlargements, combined with political stagnation 
or regression in the East, mean that principled geopolitical change draws to an end and, 
along with it, the kind and character of American activities. According to Polish 
strategists, the United States, a state that supports political transformation and ensures 
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psychological security, should, to a larger degree, become a partner in common 
undertakings in the areas of economy, politics, and science. As for cooperation on global 
terrorism and organized crime, both countries should continue to cooperate, but it should 
be done within a NATO framework. Another pillar of the Polish–American collaboration 
is police, intelligence, and public security cooperation.166 Poland’s contribution to 
transatlantic relations to tighten the bilateral Polish–American bond should be conductive 
to America in Europe and Europe in America. Just as America wants to lead but not to 
command, Europe wants to increase cooperation, not opposition to America. 
Although Atlanticism continues to dominate Poland’s security thinking, there is 
also a growing desire among the Polish ruling elite to maintain a balance in the Atlantic 
and European security dimension.167 Unfortunately, there are different views in Poland 
and “old” Europe concerning European security and the presence of the United States 
there. To Poland, the Americans are essential not only for ensuring security, but also for 
guaranteeing that there will be no dangerous renationalization of European security 
policies.168  
Since its 2004 accession to the EU, one of Poland’s main strategic goals is to 
achieve an appropriate position within the European structure so as to ensure its vital 
influence on key decisions. In Poland today there is a need for a united, effective, and 
solid Europe which could facilitate dynamic economic growth, with a leveling of the 
disproportion in regard to regional issues. The key to political and economical revival is 
further enlargement of the EU, the most powerful tool for shaping its neighborhood.169  
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The main instrument necessary to realize this policy should be the CFSP, which 
unfortunately has many weaknesses and is considered the weakest aspect of the European 
Union. Poland’s approach is similar to that of most new EU members who say that the 
Union acts too slow and too late when there is a need for European engagement. 
Moreover, according to Polish officials, the EU’s foreign and security policy is too 
focused on issues concerning western Europeans, and, what is more, the participation of 
new EU members in the decision-making process is limited. Thus, it is very important 
that cooperation in shaping a future foreign and security policy should be based on 
collaboration and the common political will of all elements of the Union in order to work 
toward a political consensus concerning various security issues.170 A good example of an 
improvement of foreign-policy effectiveness was the EU’s active engagement in the 
Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004. Poland is particularly eager for further 
development of the EU and its ability to play an active role in the East, especially in 
regard to relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Russia, because cooperation with 
its eastern neighbors is one of Poland’s vital interests.171   
Another crucial issue for Poland’s security and defense policy is the role of the 
European Security and Defense Policy, which recently gained greater importance but is 
still in a phase of deep transformation. This is a result of the end of West–East 
confrontation which directly influenced changes in the parameters of security policies on 
the European continent. Like other new Europeans, the Polish attitude toward the ESDP 
has undergone considerable evolution, from skepticism to cautious enthusiasm.172 The 
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European security and defense structure and planning capacity, regardless of NATO. This 
confirmed Poland’s fears that the ESDP might be politicized and eventually duplicates 
NATO.173  
The atmosphere surrounding the ESDP substantially improved in 2002 when the 
EU–NATO declaration provided a formal basis for cooperation between both 
organizations in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management. The declaration 
outlines the political principles for EU–NATO cooperation and gives the European Union 
assured access to NATO’s planning and logistics capabilities for its own military 
operations.174 Unfortunately, the lack of strong leadership in the EU, the languid and 
complicated decision-making structure, and the susceptibility of the biggest states to act 
independently during the crisis illustrate the difficulties in building a Common Foreign 
and Defense Policy (CFDP). Nevertheless, the European security policy poses the answer 
to essential needs of European identity, and also to new challenges and threats. Today, 
for Poland, the challenge is to appropriately evaluate these tendencies and to build its 
position as a reliable and active participant in the rising mechanisms that will consolidate 
security and stability in Europe and beyond it.175 
Warsaw is ready to take on its responsibilities, contribute to the development of 
the ESDP, and fulfill the EU’s “Headline Goal” by participating in peacekeeping and 
anticrisis actions, even if those actions are out of the area. This includes the engagement 
of Polish troops within the confines of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), 
knowing the ERRF needs to be improved and has several unresolved problems to 
overcome. These problems mainly stem from the lack of appropriate capabilities in the 
fields of intelligence, logistics, communications, and strategic lift caused by the political 
and economical difficulties of Europeans.176 In May 2004, the European Ministers of 
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Defense determined a new “Headline Goal 2010” that assumes the creation of Battle 
Groups that are capable of conducting wide-spectrum anticrisis operations up to 6,000 
km from Brussels, and lasting from 30 to 120 days. According to previous arrangements, 
the Battle Groups should reach their full operational capability in 2007.177 
The Polish–German Battle Group, with the participation of Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Slovakia, is scheduled to start its activities in 2009. The Polish–German position, 
however, assumes that the Battle Groups cannot violate the cohesion of NATO Response 
Forces because those have priority importance for both states.178 Many believe that the 
creation of Battle Groups is desirable and essential because they may serve as preparation 
for bigger operations on the strength of an initial military (Battle Groups) that is part of a 
stronger tactical-operational command of European intervention forces. 
For now, however, Europeans are struggling with a lack of the financial resources 
needed to realize this concept. In addition, there is an evident lack of political consensus 
between EU members on the definition, meaning, character, and method for conducting 
future military operations. That is why the idea of Battle Groups can only be a virtual 
entity.179  
Although Poland still has a lot of work to do in the area of its security and defense 
policy, its geopolitical situation has radically changed over the past seventeen years. The 
everlasting dilemma resulting from Poland’s geographical location between Germany and 
Russia has finally been resolved. The way to overcome two overpowering and invasive 
former global powers is its strategic alliance with the United States, which facilitated 
Poles’ return to the European Community and became an important part of its security 
environment. To Europe, through Germany, the American way: that is a brief summary 
of the optimal geopolitical strategy for Poland in the twenty-first century.180     
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since 1989, Poland’s security, political, and economical situation has changed 
radically. During that time, Poland has evolved from a communist country into a state 
that largely exercises and deeply supports democratic values. The success of the process 
of transformation in Poland is a result of multilateral cooperation at different levels with 
diverse organizations in Europe and beyond. In addition, internal consensus among 
Poland’s political elites and the peoples’ support facilitated achievement of strategic 
goals such as membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and the European Union. 
In spite of many disputes, revolts, and political crises, no government in Poland has 
challenged the vision of Poland’s development based on fundamental democratic values, 
such as human rights, a free market economy, law and order, and social justice. 
Undoubtedly, Poland had not had such good conditions for building its sovereignty and 
developing its economic potential for a long time.  
Poland’s accession into NATO in March 1999 surely constitutes one of the 
biggest events in its modern history. The importance of this event was expressed in both 
the 2000 and the 2003 national security strategies, which recognize NATO as the main 
guarantor of Polish security. At the same time, it also ensures politico-military stability in 
Europe. Poland’s membership in the Atlantic Alliance, however, is not only benefits and 
privileges. In becoming a rightful member of NATO, Poland accepted specific 
commitments, both political and military. The method and the range of Poland’s 
fulfillment of these obligations will determine its allied credibility.  
That is why it is particularly important for Poland to take an active part in 
prevention undertakings that facilitate preservation of “international peace and security 
on both a regional and global scale.”181 Therefore, Poland is present in the Balkans, in 
Afghanistan, and in Iraq, not to mention its UN peacekeeping missions in the Golan 
Heights and Lebanon. In spite of the fact that Poland does not have as great an 
economical potential as most western European countries and that its GDP per capita is 
one of the lowest in the entire EU, Poland accomplished some significant military 
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achievements that are comparable to those achieved by the “old” European countries.182 
One example of that is Poland’s participation in the Iraqi Freedom Operation, which 
undoubtedly strengthens its position on the European stage and proves that Poland is a 
reliable partner that is ready to share the burden with other allies. Moreover, it shows that 
the Polish armed forces are able to cooperate within the NATO framework and take part 
of the responsibility for global security. 
Another very significant factor that strengthens Poland’s military and economical 
security is its membership in the European Union. The end of negotiations and signing of 
the Access Treaty were a crowning achievement to the many efforts of Polish society. 
Today, despite some problems, the European Union is a successful and unique political 
project that combines the policies of all the individual member states. Surely, the idea of 
European integration along with transatlantic cooperation has helped avert the centuries-
old curse of danger and an unfair balance of power, which the incessant domination of 
superpowers in Europe. Obviously, even today, some of the nations’ interests are 
divergent, as the biggest and wealthiest EU countries try to dominate, creating a variety 
of smaller coalitions within the EU framework. It is a very dangerous phenomenon, 
which mobilizes Poland to bigger engagement on the European stage and which could 
facilitate the equal development of all the member states.  
Another very important goal of Poland’s security and defense policy, which also 
has a strategic aspect, is a common European policy toward Central and Eastern Europe. 
Therefore, Poland tries to draw Europe’s attention toward the eastern European states and 
Russia, whose democracies and economies are still fragile and susceptible to any external 
or internal turbulence and, in case of their failure, may lead to serious security 
consequences on the whole continent.183 Thus, Poland wants the Western countries to 
focus not only on issues concerning the Middle East or Africa, but also to pay more 
attention to the European continent, especially countries like Belarus. 
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In this area, the Polish security and defense policy achieved partial success, 
engaging the EU representatives in an “Orange Revolution” that facilitates the further 
development of Ukraine toward democratic values. Moreover, Poland, as one of the 
biggest and most influential states in the region, became a fervent supporter of further 
NATO enlargement which brought, among other things, the Baltic States and Slovakia 
into the transatlantic community. 
All the political undertakings of the Polish security and defense policy in regard 
to the Eastern dimension, however, has been strongly supported by the United States, 
which constitutes a strategic partnership for Poland. As far as the Polish political elites 
are concerned, they still consider the United States as a most valuable partner, which let 
Poland gain more power on the European stage. Although the bilateral partnership 
between Poland and the United States has a very long tradition and is very important for 
Poland, the Polish government emphasizes that all security and defense issues should be 
resolved within the NATO framework. But a NATO in which the transatlantic 
community constitutes the basis on which European security is built.  
The common European Security and Defense Policy is an important new element 
of the security system, but, undoubtedly, only NATO and the United States are able to 
guarantee regional and global security. Obviously, the politico-military situation in the 
world has changed, so NATO and U.S. policies must also constantly change. That is why 
Poland’s priorities should be to adjust its policy to the new challenges and threats, while 
simultaneously maintaining the balance between the Atlantic and European security 
dimensions.184 
The Polish traditions of struggle, for independence and freedom, and its 
experience of a successful transformation provide the necessary political know-how that 
entitles Poland to participate in other international security organizations that contribute 
to the dissemination of human rights, democratic values, and a free market economy. 
Some of the most common forms of these activities are the peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions that are conducted by Poland under the auspices of the United 
Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
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Europe. This kind of activity imposes on Poland the role of promoter of international 
solidarity, which is open to the needs not only of neighboring countries, but also of 
countries in other parts of the world. That is why the role of Poland in the region, in the 
new Europe, and in the world will depend in the foreseeable future solely on Polish 
accomplishments, failures.      
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